BY THE ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
SELF-INSPECTION CHECKLIST 32-7

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Civil Engineering

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE

OPR: A4/7X
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This checklist reflects command Civil Engineer requirements to prepare for and conduct unit self-inspections. It complements AFI 10-2501, *Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*, DoD 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, and implements the guidance found in AFI90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, and the AFSPC supplement to it. Effective unit self-inspections serve as the foundation for commanders to ensure compliance with governing directives. This publication applies to HQ AFSPC, 14th Air Force and their assigned wings. It does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) units (unless under federal activation). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication;* route AF IMT 847s from the fields through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://afrims.amc.af.mil/.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This checklist clarifies new guidance in emergency response planning and operation to include Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) criteria. This checklist has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

1. References have been provided for all items. Critical items have been kept to a minimum and are related to public law, safety, security, fiscal responsibility and/or mission accomplishment.

2. This publication establishes a baseline guide to be used by units during their self-inspection process. The Command IG will use this checklist during applicable assessments. Items designated as Critical require direct IG evaluation per AFI90-201. Non-critical items will be evaluated as time permits. Non-compliance with an item designated as Critical does not necessarily equate to a critical deficiency during an IG inspection. Attention to non-critical items helps gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of

the unit. AFSPC checklists will not be supplemented. Units produce their own stand-alone checklists, as needed, to ensure an effective and thorough review of the unit program. See Attachment 1.

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Attachment 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE

Table A1.1. Checklist.

SECTION 1: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE **MISSION STATEMENT:** Protect the public, mitigate public health and safety concerns and lessen the effects in the event of major accident/incident involving nuclear weapons. ***NOTE:*** All references are from AFI 10-2501, *Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations,* unless otherwise noted.			
1.1. CRITICAL ITEMS:	**YES**	**NO**	**N/A**
1.1.1. Has the installation developed a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 which addresses adequate response procedures to a Nuclear Weapon Accident to alleviate dangerous exposure of personnel? (para 4.3. and 4.6.4.)			
1.1.2. Does the installation have capability to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons and their components as the Initial Response Base (IRB)? (para 4.6.5.4)			
1.1.3. Are firefighting checklists developed for all locations where nuclear weapons and/or systems are present? (AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, para 2.7.5.4)			
1.1.4. Has the installation commander ensured that the disaster response force (DRF) is staffed and equipped to respond to a nuclear weapons accident? (para 4.6.5.1)			
1.1.5. Did the DRF establish command and control? Perform emergency operations to save lives and provide fire protection? (para 2.4.2.1)			
1.2. NON-CRITICAL ITEMS:	**YES**	**NO**	**N/A**
1.2.1. Did the responders determine the presence of contamination at the accident and around the cordon perimeter? (para 4.8.4.2)			
1.2.2. Did the Incident Commander (IC) establish a National Defense Area (NDA) with the advice of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) as required? (para 2.4.2.9)			
1.2.3. Did the DRF document the names of civilian and military personnel who were at the accident site? (DoD 3150.8-M, para AP10.2.2.2.)			
1.2.4. Did EOD advise the IC on weapons recovery and supervise the initial render safe procedures as required? (DoD 3150.8-M, para C6.5.2.)			
1.2.5. Did the IC establish a safe route for responders to the accident scene and plot an Entry Control Point (ECP)? (Attachment A4, Table A4.11, #3)			
1.2.6. Did Public Affairs ensure that information concerning the accident, DOD personnel, equipment, property or other resources is released as applicable? (AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*, Section 7F *Nuclear Weapons*, and AFI 10-2501, para 4.6.5.3)			

1.2. NON-CRITICAL ITEMS (Cont'd):	YES	NO	N/A
1.2.7. Did the Bioenvironmental Engineer: (Table A3.2)			
1.2.7.1. Conduct planning, sampling and analysis operations to identify CBRN materials and pathogens in support of health risk assessment and health hazard control, but not for risk assessment? (#3)			
1.2.7.2. Determine the personnel protection requirements for people entering the cordon? (#9)			
1.2.8. Did the security Forces representative (SF): (Table A3.8)			
1.2.8.1. Establish IC if first on scene to a CBRN event? (1)			
1.2.8.2. Provide scene observations and information to support identification? (3)			
1.2.8.3. Provide oversight of perimeter security and site entry until released by appropriate authority? (8)			
1.2.9. Did the weather representative advise the EOC on meteorological conditions that might affect the operation? (Table A4.38, #11)			
1.2.10. Did the installation ensure notification of the Nuclear Weapons Accident was reported to higher headquarters and the National Military Command Center (NMCC)? (AFI 10-206 *Operational Reporting,* Table 3.4, Section 5)			
1.2.11. Was a contamination control station (CCS) established for monitoring and decontaminating personnel leaving the accident site? (DoD 3150.8-M, AP10.1.4)			
1.2.12. Was the minimum public withdrawal distance established as directed by AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*?			
1.2.13. Was an initial perimeter survey done outside and downwind of cordon to determine if contamination existed? (DoD 3150.8-M, AP6.1)			
1.2.14. If senior military authority or assessment is required on scene, did the EOC Director appoint and brief a replacement? (para 2.4.2.9)			
1.2.15. Did the Installation Commander use OPREP-3 and situation reports to report the installation's overall EM response to include Terrorist Use of CBRNE and DSCA support? (para 8.3.)			
1.2.16. Did the Readiness and EM flight define the initial contamination footprint to include declaring the CCA and CCS areas contamination-free? (A3, Table 3.3, #2)			
1.2.17. Did the Readiness and EM flight clear an area to establish ECP and CCS for radiological detection operations? (A4, Table 4.12, #36)			
1.2.18. Did the Readiness and EM flight supervise CCS operations during radiological and nuclear incidents? (A4, Table 4.12, #39)			
1.2.19. Did FES determine hazardous exposure levels for first responders and initial public protection actions for chemical and radiological hazards when CE Readiness and Emergency Management and BEE are not immediately available? (A3, Table A3.7, #17)			